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THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE - U.S. POLICY
AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR
LEBANON
BY JOHN CERONE*
The pioneering work of Professor Ved Nanda in the field of international criminal law,' as well as his commitment to international justice, inspired the subject to the present article - the legitimacy of international criminal courts.
In his July 10, 2011 opinion piece in the Denver Post, Professor
Nanda wrote of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) issuance of arrest warrants for Moammar Qaddafi, his son Seif al-Islam, and his intelligence chief. 2 As Libya is not a party to the ICC Statute, the Court's
jurisdiction arose from a Security Council resolution referring the situation in Libya to the Court. Alternatively, the Security Council could
have followed past practice and established an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, or a hybrid tribunal, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
to prosecute international crimes perpetrated in Libya.
The decision to establish an ad hoc tribunal is necessarily a political one. In elaborating the statute of such tribunal, the Security Council could decide the personal, geographic, and temporal scope of its jurisdiction, as well as the crimes that would fall within its subject matter
jurisdiction. The law establishing and shaping the tribunal's jurisdiction is similarly driven by a political process. The jurisdiction of such a
tribunal could be limited temporally to a relatively narrow period of a
few months - perhaps January through March 2011. It could be limited
geographically to the territory of Libya, or even to subdivisions of Libyan territory. Its personal jurisdiction could be limited to Libyan nationals, or to those fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi regime. It is even
conceivable that its personal jurisdiction could be limited to certain
named individuals.

* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law & Policy at
New England Law, Boston.
1. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW (1973).

2. See, e.g., Ved Nanda, Justice Will Find Khadafy, DENVER PosT (July 10, 2011,
1:00 am), http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_18436020.
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The U.S. government has played a key role in establishing and circumscribing the jurisdiction of international and hybrid criminal courts.
In so doing, the U.S. has not been shy about insisting on certain jurisdictional exclusions. It is debatable whether the fashioning of the contours of an international tribunal's jurisdiction is subject to any legal
constraints. The present article focuses on whether there are constraints of a different nature. Is there a point at which the fine-tuning
of a tribunal's jurisdiction deprives it of legitimacy?
This article traces the evolution of policy strands underpinning the
U.S. government's attitudes toward international criminal courts and
examines how these policy strands converged in a position of support
for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). It also demonstrates how
U.S. foreign policy interests helped to shape the contours of the STL.
The article then discusses some of the features of the tribunal that flow
from these interests, and examines the merits of challenges to the legitimacy of the tribunal made at least in part on the basis of these features. It concludes with an examination of a spectrum of policy choices
in relation to the creation of international criminal courts and implications for their legitimacy.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS 3

Assessing the state of U.S. policy toward international criminal
courts is a complex, if not impossible, undertaking. Indeed, there is no
coherent U.S. policy on international criminal courts generally. This is
attributable on the one hand to the multifaceted nature of international
criminal courts, and on the other to the fact that U.S. policy is an amalgamation of diverse views reduced in some cases to written form, which
is itself subject to varying interpretations. Policy is also in a continual
state of flux, and its fluctuations in this arena are particularly dynamic
at the present moment in history.
Nonetheless, examining the behavior of the U.S. government over
the past one hundred years or so reveals a pattern of identifiable policy
lines relevant to the establishment of international criminal tribunals.
The U.S. has been generally supportive of the development of international law, and of the law of armed conflict in particular. It has also
supported the establishment of international courts and the incidental
development of international legal jurisprudence. Nonetheless, its support of international courts has never been absolute, and has always
been subject to competing foreign policy interests.
3. This section summarizes a more extensive historical analysis first published by
the present author in the European Journal of International Law. John P. Cerone, Dy-

namic Equilibrium: The Evolution of U.S. Policy Regarding International Criminal
Courts, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 277 (2007).
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Its selective use of international courts is most visible, and perhaps
most controversial, in the realm of international criminal justice. While
the U.S. has been generally supportive of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, it has consistently taken the position that there should be no
international criminal court of universal compulsory jurisdiction, and in
particular vis-i-vis the United States and its nationals.
U.S. Attitudes in the Pre-World- War II Era
The U.S. has been a strong supporter of the development of the international law of armed conflict since at least the mid-nineteenthcentury. However, the issue of whether international law should provide rules regulating armed conflict is quite different from whether
there should be an international mechanism to adjudicate whether
those rules have been violated.
During the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 & 1907, the U.S. supported the creation of an arbitral tribunal to resolve inter-state disputes. Although it was unwilling to submit to compulsory jurisdiction
matters implicating strong national interests, the U.S. nonetheless welcomed the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with its
purely consent-based jurisdiction, in part because of the role it would
play in developing an international jurisprudence.
At the conclusion of World War I, the victorious powers at the Paris
Peace Conference considered the creation of an international criminal
court to prosecute abuses committed during the war. The U.S. was opposed to the creation of such a court for a range of reasons. Perhaps
most significantly, accountability for war crimes simply did not rank
high on President Woodrow Wilson's post-war list of priorities. He was
far more concerned with a "moderate peace, a viable democratic government for Germany, and, most of all, a League of Nations to secure
future peace." 4 The U.S. delegation was instructed to express serious
reservations, rejecting the tribunal and opposing the trial of the Kaiser,
who, in the meantime, had found refuge in the neutral Netherlands. 5
Specifically, the U.S. argued that there was no "precedent, precept,
practice, or procedure" for such a tribunal, and that perpetrators should
instead face prosecution before national military justice machinery.6
Specifically, the U.S. favored the creation of a joint, multinational tribunal or commission. In this way "existing national tribunals or national commissions which could legally be called into being would be
4. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 15 (1992).
5. Id. at 14.

6. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties,Report Presented to the PreliminaryPeace Conference, March 29, 1919,
Annex II: Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United
States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L.
95, 142 (1920).
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utilized, and not only the law and the penalty would be already declared, but the procedure would be settled."7
The creation of an international criminal court was also considered
under the auspices of the League of Nations. Proposals to create such a
court never came to fruition. The U.S. view at that time, and indeed the
prevailing contemporary position, was that the creation of such a court
was premature. Manley Hudson, U.S. jurist and former judge of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, wrote in 1944, "[i]nstead of
attempting to create an international penal law and international agencies to administer it, perhaps attention may more usefully be given to
promoting the cooperation of national agencies in such matters as extradition, judicial assistance, jurisdiction to punish for crime, and coordinated surveillance by national police." 8 Hudson speculated that "[t]he
local impact of anti-social acts inspires the desire of States to safeguard
local condemnation and local punishment, and impingement on national prerogatives in this field will become possible only as the need for international action is clearly demonstrated."9
U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts in the PostWorld- War II Era
The horrors of World War II provided the necessary catalyst to
overcome the inertia of the international community. In striking contrast to its position at the 1919 Paris Conference, the U.S. was strongly
supportive and played a central role in the establishment of both the
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals (IMTs). While
the U.S. was initially reluctant to endorse the proposal to create these
tribunals, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson is credited with persuading the U.S. government to adopt a "judicial solution" to dealing with
Axis war criminals. 10
Although U.S. support for the creation of the IMTs may appear irreconcilable with the position taken by the U.S. delegation to the 1919
Paris Conference, it is worth noting the similarities between the IMTs
and the U.S. counterproposal to create a multinational commission or
tribunal. In addition to being run by the military, the tribunals were
operating in Germany and Japan, territories over which the U.S. was
exercising authority as an Occupying Power. Another key feature of the
tribunals is that their personal jurisdiction was expressly limited to
those acting on behalf of enemy states. Thus, there was no possibility
that those acting on behalf of the Allies would face prosecution.
A key difference from the "mixed tribunals" proposed by the U.S. in
1919, however, is that the IMTs were mandated to prosecute violations
7. Id. at 147.
8. MvANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 186 (1944).
9. Id.
10. TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 34-35.
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of international law, and not the domestic law of any country. Both tribunals were given jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Early UN Efforts to Create an InternationalCriminal Court
From the earliest days of the United Nations, the creation of an international criminal court was on its agenda. In 1946, acting on the initiative of the U.S. delegation," the UN General Assembly affirmed the
principles of international law recognized in the Charter and judgment
of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Not long after, the U.S. expressed support
for the creation of an international criminal tribunal during debates
surrounding the drafting of the 1948 Genocide Convention. However,
the U.S. also took the position that a treaty creating a permanent court
was of such a magnitude as to necessitate a separate project, and thus
opposed creating a tribunal in the Genocide Convention itself.
In 1950, the General Assembly designated a Committee that included the U.S. to prepare a preliminary draft convention relating to
the establishment of an international criminal court. Initially, there
was a wide range of views on the subject, which included strong opposition from the U.K. Although the U.S. appeared supportive, it insisted
that the envisioned court should only be able to try individuals whose
state of nationality had recognized the court's jurisdiction by treaty. After five years of work attempting to draft a statute, differences among
UN Member States, exacerbated by the Cold War, led the UN to abandon the project. It was not until the Cold War ended in 1989 that the
creation of an international criminal court would once again find a place
on the UN agenda.
The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda
U.S. support for ad hoc international criminal justice mechanisms
was clearly visible in the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The U.S. was the driving force behind the
establishment of both tribunals, contributing the greatest share of political and financial muscle. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. gained
a substantial degree of control, primarily through the Security Council,
over UN mechanisms, and was thus more inclined to make use of them.
Both the ICTY and ICTR have jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. However, unlike the IMTs, violations of the jus ad bellum are not within either tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction. The geographic jurisdiction of both tribunals is strictly
limited. For conduct occurring outside the territory of Rwanda, the ju11. Formulationof NilrnbergPrinciples, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 181,
Doc. A/CN.4/22.

29, U.N.
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risdiction of the tribunal is limited by nationality. The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited to calendar year 1994.
Overall, the U.S. has been highly supportive of both tribunals and
criticism has generally focused on bureaucratic and financial concerns.
Nonetheless, U.S. support has weakened in situations where the work
of the tribunals has conflicted with other U.S. foreign policy objectives,
such as the ICTY Prosecutor's review of the NATO bombing of Serbia
and the indictment of Radovan Karadzic in the run-up to the Dayton
Accords.
The InternationalCriminal Court
U.S. policy toward the International Criminal Court has been the
most visible and perhaps the most notorious. From the 1998 Rome Conference to the present time, U.S. policy toward the ICC shifted from the
traditional U.S. pragmatic approach to firm opposition and then back to
pragmatism.
In the early 1990s, the United States was generally supportive of
the idea of a permanent international criminal court, but the U.S. was
quite clear that such an institution should not have jurisdiction absent
either the consent of the state of nationality of the perpetrator or a Security Council referral. After the Rome Conference, at which the United
States was not completely successful in having its concerns addressed,
U.S. support waned. Nonetheless, it remained engaged in the preparations for the establishment of the Court and ultimately signed the Rome
Statute to enable its continued participation.
U.S. support lessened upon the election of George W. Bush, who
brought with him an administration that was generally antiinternationalist. This sentiment was augmented following the attacks of
September 11, 2001. By the spring of 2002, while the U.S. maintained
an official position of neutrality towards the Court, as expressed by the
U.S. in its notification that it would not proceed with ratification of the
ICC Statute, U.S. opposition to the ICC was clear. This opposition became increasingly visible, manifesting itself in the passage of legislation
and the adoption of diplomatic strategies that appeared to constitute
frontal attacks against the ICC.
Later developments, including the Security Council's Darfur referral, the transfer of the Charles Taylor trial to The Hague, and the waiver of legislative sanctions on states cooperating with the ICC, indicated
a lessening propensity for ideologically rooted or visceral responses and
a recognition of the value of the ICC in the attainment of other foreign
policy objectives. Toward the end of the George W. Bush administra-
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tion, this led the then State Department legal adviser to characterize
the U.S. attitude as "pragmatic."1 2
Internationalized,Hybrid and Related Criminal Tribunals
This pragmatic approach is also visible in U.S. support for so-called
hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).
The SCSL is distinct from the ICTY and ICTR in number of respects.
The Special Court was established by a treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone, and the Sierra Leonean government was heavily involved in
its creation. The Court is not a subsidiary body of the Security Council.
Oversight is carried out by a Management Committee drawn from a
group of interested states (who are also the principal funders), including the United States. The substantive criminal law to be applied by
the Court, codified in the Statute of the SCSL, was derived from both
international law and domestic law. The personnel of the Court are also
mixed, employing both foreign and national staff.
The U.S. was the prime sponsor of the Court as it was an opportunity to build an international justice mechanism that it viewed as
preferable to the ICC. The U.S. was also insistent that the SCSL Prosecutor be a UN national with a military background. U.S. support came
not only from the Executive branch. For a variety of reasons, the Congress was also extraordinarily and uncharacteristically supportive of
the SCSL.
Another key feature of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is found
in its jurisdictional limitations. The scope of personal jurisdiction of the
SCSL was a matter of concern for a number of UN Member State delegations. 13 These delegations initially sought to limit the personal jurisdiction of the Court to Sierra Leonean nationals. 14 Indeed, this was
stipulated in the original draft statute of the Court. 15 In the course of
the negotiations, the nationality limitation was dropped in exchange for
an exemption for peacekeepers. 1 6 This exemption is subject to Security
Council override, which of course would require the consent of its permanent members.
12. John Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep't, Legal Advisor Bellinger's Remarks on International Terrorists, at the 29th Roundtable on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law (Sep. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov
1s/1/2006/98254.htm; see also John Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep't, Speech by
Legal Advisor John B. Bellinger, III, "The United States and International Law" (June 6,
2007), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s//2007 /112666.htm. The Darfur referral,
the offer assistance of the OTP in Darfur, and the transfer of the Taylor proceedings "reflect our desire to find practical ways to work with ICC supporters to advance our shared
goals of promoting international criminal justice."
13. Interview with non-U.S. diplomat involved in the SCSL negotiations (name withheld) (Mar. 26, 2005).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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The U.S. has also been generally supportive17 of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The Extraordinary
Chambers differ from the Special Court in a number of respects. They
form part of the Cambodian judiciary, they were created on the basis of
domestic legislation, and their subject matter jurisdiction is circumscribed by this same domestic law. A treaty between Cambodia and the
UN regulates UN participation in the operation of the ECCC. In addition, as with the other hybrids, U.S. support was facilitated by the inclusion of restrictive language in circumscribing the scope of the Chambers' jurisdiction. The Chambers have jurisdiction to prosecute only
"Suspects," who are defined essentially as those members of the Khmer
Rouge who committed international crimes from 1975 - 1979.18

The U.S. has also been largely supportive of other courts with an
international dimension, including the internationalized Kosovo and
East Timorese court systems, and the Bosnian War Crimes chamber.
Similar to the ad hoc courts mentioned above, the U.S. has provided political, financial and personnel support in the work of each of these institutions. All of these institutions bring justice closer to the national
level in some respect, and the establishment of each dovetailed with
other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In general, as hostility toward international institutions increased,
the United States began to show increasing support for hybrid institutions. However, as with other international criminal justice mechanisms, U.S. support for the hybrids has been strongly influenced by
competing foreign policy objectives, as well as the possibility of prosecution of U.S. nationals, especially U.S. agents.
The Obama Administration and the Policy of "PrincipledEngagement"
The Obama Administration has adopted a policy of "principled engagement" with international organizations, including the International
Criminal Court. The generally positive tone adopted by his administration heralded a continuation of the trend toward constructive engagement already in evidence during the latter years of the Bush administration. It also signaled a continuation of a pragmatic approach.
17. At times, U.S. political support for the ECCC has been tepid. This is attributable
in part to conflicting views within Congress and opposition to the Chambers on the part of
a number of human rights NGOs. Congressional ambivalence results from the fact that
different Cambodian diaspora groups, as constituencies of several members of Congress,
have different views on the Chambers. Although all of these groups want to see an accountability process, they are divided as to whether the Extraordinary Chambers can provide credible justice.
18. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 Oct. 2004 (NS/RKI/1004/006), art. 2, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR Law-as-amended_27_Oct_20
04 Eng.pdf.
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The U.S. under Obama re-engaged with the ICC Assembly of States
Parties, and was a highly visible and intensely active participant at the
ICC Review Conference in Kampala in June 2010. The large U.S. delegation exerted intense pressure to narrow the definition of the crime of
aggression, and to limit its personal scope of application. It strove to
ensure that the Court would not have jurisdiction for the crime of aggression over U.S. nationals or nationals of NATO allies. While it was
unable to secure agreement on giving the Security Council the exclusive
power to trigger aggression prosecutions, the U.S. did succeed in obtaining an exemption for nationals of non-States Parties, even when their
conduct occurs on the territory of States Parties.
Nonetheless, the Obama administration has undertaken initiatives
that indirectly support the work of the ICC. In October 2011, President
Obama "authorized a small number of combat equipped U.S. forces to
deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are
working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield."1 9
The ICC has been seeking the arrest of Kony since 2005. At the same
time, Obama's announcement of this initiative made no mention of the
International Criminal Court arrest warrant, or indeed of any criminal
justice response.
Principles and Themes of U.S. Policy toward International Criminal Courts
The U.S. continues to publicly base its policy toward international
criminal courts on the following principles.
1. The United States is in principle committed to justice and accountability for all. This does not mean, however, that the United
States seeks accountability at any cost. Even in cases in which the U.S.
attitude toward international criminal courts is at its most favorable,
these institutions are not viewed as ends in themselves. The U.S. approach is pragmatic - each institution is assessed in terms of its ability
to advance U.S. interests, which include, but are not limited to, promoting accountability and the rule of law on the international level. When
accountability efforts at the domestic level fail, the U.S. resorts to a
balancing of interests. When international accountability efforts conflict
with strong national interests, those interests will prevail.
2. It is best to prosecute crimes, including all international crimes,
at the national level. Prosecution by any other court (including domestic
courts of other countries) 20 should be the last resort.
19. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army, (Oct. 14,
2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-presidentspeaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore.
20. There are of course strong parallels with the U.S. position on the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
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3. The Security Council should have the final word on prosecution
by any other court. The United States is strongly interested in maintaining the primacy of the Security Council in matters of peace and security. The United States regards the existence of the ICC as a threat to
this primacy. Most observers assert that this position is a direct consequence of the status of the United States as a permanent member of the
Council.
In addition, the historical survey above reveals certain consistent
themes underlying U.S. attitudes toward international criminal courts.
One consistent element would appear to be the (un)likelihood of prosecution of U.S. nationals. The United States has tended to support international criminal courts when the U.S. government has (or is perceived
by U.S. officials to have) a significant degree of control over the court or
when the possibility of prosecution of U.S. nationals is either expressly
precluded or otherwise remote. This was certainly the case for the postWorld War II military tribunals, as well as the Security Council ad hoc
tribunals. U.S. support for the hybrid tribunals was similarly facilitated
by the inclusion of jurisdictional limitations and other assurances of
nonprosecution of U.S. nationals.
If the United States is assured that U.S. nationals will not be prosecuted (or, at least, not without its consent), it will engage in a balancing of interests to determine its level of support or opposition. Ideological leanings will of course color this balancing of interests and at times
define some of those interests. To the extent an administration's ideological strain in favor of criminal accountability is stronger than its ideological strain opposed to the creation of international authority, the
prospect of U.S. support of a given international criminal court seems to
increase.
II.

THE U.S. AND THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established in the
wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri, and the STL's jurisdiction is tightly focused on this crime.
France was the driving force behind the creation of the tribunal.
France was keen to establish the STL for a number of reasons, including its historical ties to Lebanon as well as the close personal relationship that had existed between Hariri and Jacques Chirac, then President of France. In its quest to have the tribunal established, the French
government was willing to accommodate concerns of other permanent
members of the Security Council.
The STL was originally envisioned as a hybrid tribunal to be established by bilateral treaty between the UN and Lebanon, modeled after
the treaty establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In early
2006, "[r]ecalling the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783) requesting inter alia
the establishment of a tribunal of an international character to try all
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those who are found responsible for" the Hariri assassination, the UN
Security Council requested the Secretary General to negotiate an
agreement with Lebanon for the establishment of such a tribunal. The
Secretary General proceeded to do so. However, the Lebanese government failed to take the necessary internal steps to bring the agreement
into force. In response to this impasse, the Security Council decided to
use its Chapter VII authority to bring the agreement into force.
The U.S. is extremely supportive of the mission and work of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). 21 The U.S. is the largest funder,
after Lebanon; it is a member of the Tribunal's Management Committee; and it is actively supporting the extension of the Tribunal's mandate. 22 The U.S. has also made clear that its support is not contingent
on the continued support of the Lebanese government. A spokesperson
for the U.S. State Department recently stated, "The Special Tribunal's
work represents a chance for Lebanon to move beyond its long history of
impunity for political violence. The Lebanese authorities' support for,
and cooperation with, the work of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a
critical international commitment."23
A review of some of the Tribunal's features demonstrates why U.S.
support for the Tribunal is unsurprising. The initial request for the
creation of a Tribunal came from Lebanon. Although based in the
Hague, it is a hybrid tribunal, with both Lebanese and foreign personnel. The STL, while originally envisioned as being a treaty based court,
was ultimately created on the basis of the Security Council's Chapter
VII authority. Oversight is conducted by a Management Committee, of
which the U.S. is a member.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is very narrowly circumscribed.
The STL's jurisdiction encompasses only the assassination of Hariri and
other related "attacks" between October 1, 2004, and December 12,
2005. The Tribunal can take jurisdiction over subsequent related attacks only with the consent of the Security Council. Thus, any member
of the Security Council may veto jurisdiction over acts committed after
December 2005. The tight focus of its jurisdiction lessens the chance of
mandate creep, and is backed up by the requirement of Security Council
authorization for expansion.
Further, the STL's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to crimes
under Lebanese law, including those "provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of terror-

21. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Opening of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (Mar. 1, 2009) availableat www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2009/03/119896.htm.
22. The Agreement establishing the Tribunal included a three-year sunset provision.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, United States Welcomes the Funding of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Nov. 30, 2011) available at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177953.htm.

2012

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

55

ism." 24 As a hybrid institution, it conformed to the U.S. position that
justice should be done as close to the domestic level as possible, and
that prosecution should only be internationalized to the extent strictly
necessary. Internationalization was deemed necessary for security and
for capacity reasons, including bolstering judicial independence. Lebanese law was deemed a sufficient basis for criminal responsibility.
In addition, the Statute of the Tribunal does not expressly abrogate
immunities. It also includes a somewhat higher threshold for the liability of superiors than that set forth in the ICC Statute. These features
arguably help to keep the Tribunal focused on Lebanese actors by creating additional obstacles to prosecuting foreign officials.
Other foreign policy interests factored into U.S. policy toward the
STL. The U.S. had been keen on supporting Lebanon against Syria.
The focus on the assassination of the pro-Western / anti-Syria Hariri
meant that the tribunal's findings would likely implicate forces unfriendly to the west, namely Hezbollah and Syria.
However, the Statute of the STL was being drafted during the
summer of 2006, while an armed conflict raged between Israel and
Hezbollah on Lebanese territory. The conflict inflicted extensive harm
to life, infrastructure, and property, and was accompanied by grave allegations that international crimes were being committed by Hezbollah
and Israeli forces. This of course added an additional dimension to U.S.
concern over possible mandate-creep by the Tribunal. As such, the U.S.
pushed strongly for the tight jurisdictional limitations.
The U.S. also insisted that the subject matter jurisdiction be limited to crimes under Lebanese law. The U.S. feared that the inclusion
of war crimes and crimes against humanity within the Tribunal's jurisdiction would lead to difficult questions as to why its temporal jurisdiction did not extend to the armed conflict with Israel, or perhaps to requests to the Security Council to extend the temporal jurisdiction on
that basis.
The U.S. had an unlikely ally in Russia in its attempts to preclude
prosecution of foreign officials. Russia was keen to protect Syria, and
similarly insisted on the exclusion of international crimes, as well as
the exclusion of any abrogation of immunity.
All of these features - the exclusion of international crimes; the absence of a provision abrogating immunity; the heightened standard for
superior liability; the tight, event-based jurisdiction; the temporal limitation with extension subject to Security Council approval - make prosecution of U.S. officials or those of U.S. allies highly unlikely, clearing
the way for U.S. support.

24. S.C. Res. 1757, Sec. I, art. II, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 757 (May 30, 2007).

56

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 40:1-3

III. LEGITIMACY AND THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM
The legitimacy of the STL has been challenged on a number of
grounds. Some have impugned the legitimacy of the STL by reference
to the fact that its jurisdiction is focused on only one event; that the applicable criminal law is limited to domestic Lebanese law; that the
Statute of the Tribunal, initially drafted as a treaty, could not be
brought into force by Security Council resolution; that the temporal jurisdiction was limited to preclude the possibility of prosecuting Israelis
for conduct committed in the 2006 armed conflict; that the Statute permits trials in absentia; that the creation of the STL constitutes an impermissible interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon; that it was
an inappropriate use of the Security Council's Chapter VII power; and
that it constitutes selective justice.
Most of these challenges can be readily dismissed whether by reference to existing, accepted practice or on the level of principle. Nonetheless, it is useful to examine each challenge, as well as their cumulative
effect.
That its jurisdiction is focused on only one event: There is no reason
in principle to object to the creation of a tribunal with jurisdiction to
prosecute conduct related to a single event. To begin with, international
criminal justice is still primarily rendered on an ad hoc basis. To the
extent that this essentially reduces to a charge of selective justice, it
will be addressed below. If for now, we accept the principle of ad hoc
justice as legitimate, then the breadth or narrowness of jurisdiction is
not of itself problematic. Each ad hoc tribunal created to date has had
jurisdictional limitations tied to an event, or series of related events.
The jurisdiction of the Rwanda tribunal centers around the genocide
that took place there in 1994, and the tribunal's temporal jurisdiction is
thus limited to calendar year 1994. Of course there is a difference in
the scale of the violence perpetrated there and the Hariri assassination,
but that distinction goes to the legitimacy of the decision to create a tribunal in response to the event, which will be addressed below.
That the applicable criminal law is limited to domestic Lebanese
law: The STL is not the only hybrid tribunal to apply domestic law. Indeed most of the hybrid tribunals created to date were given jurisdiction
to prosecute certain violations of the domestic law of the relevant state.
Indeed, the subject matter jurisdiction of the ECCC consists entirely of
Cambodian law. Many of those crimes are derived from international
law, but the same could be said of the crime of terrorism within the subject matter of the STL. Indeed the STL has drawn upon international
law to inform its interpretation of the crime of terrorism under Lebanese law.
That the Statute of the Tribunal, initially drafted as a treaty, could
not be brought into force by Security Council resolution: This challenge
is limited to the technical issue of the Security Council's legal authority,
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and whether that authority extends to the bringing into force of a treaty. If the Security Council is properly acting pursuant to its Chapter
VII authority (an issue that will be discussed below), there is no doubt
that it would have the power to create the Tribunal and to impose upon
Lebanon all of the obligations set forth in the Agreement and Statute of
the STL. This is settled by the accepted practice of the United Nations
and its Member States in relation to the creation and operation of the
ICTY and ICTR.
The particular objection here is thus of a highly technical nature whether the Security Council can bring into force the treaty as such. It
is now generally accepted that the Security Council when acting within
the scope of its mandate may impose legal obligations on UN Member
States. Indeed, this power has even been interpreted to extend to a
quasi-legislative authority, as seen in the Security Council resolutions
following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the Unites States that required all states to adopt domestic legislation to criminalize certain terrorism related conduct. The International Court of Justice has opined
that in ascertaining the legally binding character of Security Council
resolutions, the touchstone is whether the Council intends to bind
Member States. The clearest expression of this intent is the use of the
term "decides," as it is "decisions" of the Security Council that all Member States are legally obliged to carry out under Article 25 of the UN
Charter. By expressly invoking its Chapter VII authority and by using
the term "decides," the Security Council clearly demonstrated its intent
to legally establish the Tribunal and to impose upon Lebanon the legal
obligations contained in the Tribunal's Agreement and Statute, which
were annexed to that Resolution.
More broadly, the Security Council's Chapter VII authority is now
generally understood to include the power to impose legal obligations on
all UN Member States, and indeed even on those states that are not
members of the UN; to override the non-intervention principle; and, essentially, to substitute its consent for that of Member States (e.g. waiving immunities of a Member State's officials or substituting consent to a
treaty).
That the temporal jurisdiction was limited to preclude the possibility of prosecuting Israelis for conduct committed in the 2006 armed conflict: The exclusion of the 2006 armed conflict from the STL's jurisdiction follows directly from the ad hoc nature of the tribunal. The STL
was created, as are all ad hoc tribunals, to deal with a particular event,
or series of connected events, occurring in a particular time and place.
Is there a principled basis for excluding crimes committed during the
2006 armed conflict from the jurisdiction of the STL? It is simply that
that is not the event for which the tribunal was created. In order to
keep the work of the STL focused on the Hariri assassination, the tribunal's jurisdictional limitations were intentionally designed to prevent
mandate-creep. The fact that the international community has not de-
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cided to employ a tribunal to deal with the issues that arose in the 2006
armed conflict is a separate matter, and will be addressed below under
the charge of selective justice.
That the Statute permits trials in absentia: The STL Statute provides for trials in absentia, and the STL Trial Chamber recently decided
to proceed with trials in absentia for the four accused, all of whom are
members of or otherwise connected to Hezbollah. Not since the postWorld War II IMTs has an international criminal tribunal been empowered to hold trials in absentia. At the same time, the inclusion of this
facility in the STL Statute is unsurprising since the domestic law of
Lebanon expressly permits trials in absentia within the Lebanese criminal justice system. Trials in absentia are also permitted under international human rights law, subject to certain conditions. The drafters
of the Statute included these conditions in the Statute in order to ensure compliance with international human rights law. 2 5
That the creation of the STL constitutes an impermissible interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon: The Lebanese government, and
indeed Lebanese society, is deeply divided between primarily two political camps. Those who assert that the STL is illegitimate regard this political dispute, of which the Hariri assassination is one element, as a
purely internal matter, and that interference by foreign states or by the
United Nations constitutes a violation of the principle of nonintervention, one of the bedrock principles of the international legal
system. The most straightforward response 26 to this challenge may be
found in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which codifies the nonintervention principle. Article 2(7) states, "Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." This last phrase is
a sufficient rejoinder to claims of unlawful intervention. The Security
Council expressly invoked its Chapter VII authority in bringing into
force the legal basis of the Tribunal. Whether the Security Council acted properly in invoking its Chapter VII authority in the context of the
situation in Lebanon is addressed next.
That it was an inappropriate use of the Security Council's Chapter
VII power: The decision to invoked Chapter VII authority is essentially

25. Id. Sec. III, art. XXII
26. It could also be argued that there has been no interference since the Prime Minister of Lebanon initially requested the establishment of the Tribunal. However, this argument is subject to the challenge that Lebanon failed to take the necessary steps to bring
the Agreement into force, necessitating the use of the Security Council's Chapter VII authority.
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a political decision. The Security Council's official justification for creating the STL is that the climate of impunity for political assassination
in Lebanon must be challenged. There have been dozens of political assassinations in Lebanon over the past few decades. The Tribunal's supporters claim that the prosecution of the perpetrators of the Hariri assassination will serve as a deterrent, discouraging continuation of the
practice of assassination as a political tool.
While this decision is essentially political, there are legal restraints
on the Security Council's discretion. The ICTY, in its seminal Tadic Appeal decision of 1995, set forth the legal limits on the scope of the Security Council's Chapter VII authority. It recalled that article 39 of the
UN Charter empowers the Security Council to "determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and
to "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." The
ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the Security Council had broad discretion to make this determination and to fashion measures in response. It is not unreasonable for the Security Council to find the political instability in Lebanon to constitute a threat to peace and security.
Nor is it unreasonable to determine that a tribunal focused on ending
impunity for political assassinations is a measure directed toward the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. This is
supported by ample practice. The Security Council has repeatedly
found the situation in Lebanon to constitute a threat to peace and security, and it has used its Chapter VII power in other contexts to create
tribunals as measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
That it constitutes selective justice: In light of the above analyses,
it is apparent that the technical legal objections to the STL's legitimacy
are relatively easily overcome. Legitimacy, however, entails more than
just legality.
Several of the charges above relate or reduce to the assertion that
the STL is illegitimate as it constitutes an instance of selective justice.
This is the most complex challenge to the legitimacy of the Tribunal, as
it can be understood on a number of levels. It is also the charge against
which U.S. policy in relation to the STL is most vulnerable.
On one level, all justice is selective, both in the international legal
system and in domestic legal systems. In no legal system is every crime
prosecuted. Indeed, it would be impossible to do so. Prosecutorial discretion is a common feature of legal systems around the world. The
failure to prosecute every crime does not by itself undermine the legitimacy of assigning criminal responsibility for those crimes that are prosecuted.
This is all the more true in the international legal system, with its
lack of central authority and absence of a universal justice system; its
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relatively fragile and immature institutions; the challenges in accommodating the diversity of values and of infrastructures of national systems; and the lack of a democratic basis for international authority2 7 as
the system is presently constituted. U.S. pragmatism in relation to international courts is a response to this reality.
The U.S. "pragmatic" approach was summed up by former State
Department Legal Advisor John Bellinger when he stated in May 2006:
In our view, such courts and tribunals should not be
seen as an end in themselves but rather as potential tools
to advance shared international interests in developing and
promoting the rule of law, ensuring justice and accountability, and solving legal disputes. Consistent with this approach, we evaluate the contributions that proposed international courts and tribunals may make on a case-by-case
basis, just as we consider the advantages and disadvantages of particular matters through international judicial mechanisms rather than diplomatic or other means.2 8
A pragmatic approach meant that there was an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, a hybrid tribunal for East Timor, and no tribunal for Colombia. In this sense, selective justice refers to the decision
to employ an international tribunal to deal with the situation in one
country or region, and not in another. The idea put forward by the U.S.
is that international courts are but one tool in the toolbox, and that the
international community should use that tool when it would be appropriate, helpful, and otherwise in its interests. This type of selective justice is a consequence of the political nature of the decision to create a
court in a system where courts are not a given. It is seen as an inevitable consequence of the present phase of development of the international legal system, and has been accepted as a legitimate feature in a
fragmented system.
To say that international tribunals are policy tools, however, is not
to say that the U.S. does not regard them as courts. In a sense, all
courts, whether international or domestic, are tools - tools for governance and dispute resolution. They can serve other interests as well.
The important caveat is that there are certain features of courts that
make them courts, and these features cannot be erased without delegit27. The United Nations was not designed to be a democratic system. It is embedded
in the traditional interstate system. The General Assembly is sometimes referred to as a
more democratic organ than the Security Council because each state has a vote in the
General Assembly. Of course, it is hardly democratic that China and Tuvalu should each
have one vote considering the vast difference in population size. More importantly, there
is no requirement that government delegations represent the views of the people of that
state.
28. John Bellinger, Statement given at George Washington School of Law: International Court and Tribunals and the Rule of Law (May 11, 2006).
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imizing the institution as a "court." It might become something else,
and might be a legitimate 'something else,' but it would no longer be a
court.
An indispensable feature of any court is independence. The notion
of judicial independence, and indeed of judicial supremacy in determining and interpreting the applicable law, is deeply rooted in U.S. constitutional history. It is because of this recognition of the independence of
courts, and the understanding that courts as independent organs will
take on a life of their own, that the U.S. has been careful to front-load
jurisdictional limitations that will restrict the scope of who can be prosecuted.
This of course leads to a different kind of selective justice. Instead
of referring to the decision to create a tribunal here and not there, selective justice in this sense refers to delineation of the scope of possible accused. Once a decision is taken to employ a tribunal in response to a
particular event or series of events, the tribunal's creators have discretion to define its jurisdiction. Are there limits to this discretion?
Certain jurisdictional limitations flow from traditional principles of
international law. Thus, limiting jurisdiction by reference to territory
would seem uncontroversial. Hence, the territorial jurisdiction of the
ICTY extends only to the territories of the former Yugoslavia, which is a
reasonable limitation in light of the Tribunal's mandate. But would it
be permissible to limit the ICTY's personal jurisdiction to a particular
ethnic group? Jurisdictional limitations on grounds of ethnicity, race,
religion, gender, or national origin would seem to conflict with basic
principles of human rights law, and would arguably deprive a tribunal
of legitimacy.
Would it be more acceptable if the limitation were based on nationality? Would it be legitimate if the ICTY's personal jurisdiction had
been limited to prosecuting only those of Croatian nationality? Can
such a question only be answered by reference to generally accepted
facts about a given situation? Another critical feature of courts is evenhandedness. This would clearly be compromised in the case of the ICTY
if it were restricted to prosecuting only perpetrators of one nationality.
Is it ever permissible to limit the personal jurisdiction of a tribunal
to one group? The ECCC's personal jurisdiction is essentially limited to
members of the Khmer Rouge. There would likely be very little objection on the part of states if an international tribunal were established to
prosecute exclusively members of Al Qaeda, or even if a tribunal had
been established just to prosecute Osama bin Laden.
The IMT at Nuremberg was limited to prosecuting only those acting on behalf of the Axis Powers. Consider also the jurisdiction of the
Rwanda tribunal. Some have suggested that the restriction of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to calendar year 1994 essentially meant that only
Hutus would be prosecuted. If international crimes were committed by
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all parties to these conflicts, are jurisdictional restrictions justified be
reference to the relative scale of criminality by group?
Coming back to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, it might be argued that the selection of the event that would form the focus of the
STL's jurisdiction was essentially a proxy for prosecuting a particular
group. As such, even if the Tribunal's independence is guaranteed, its
deployment constitutes selective justice in the narrow sense - that it
was essentially deployed against one party in an ongoing political conflict that has deeply divided Lebanon. Is it a case where there is political consensus on the identity of the 'bad guys'? The U.S. regards Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, but this perception is not universally
shared among states. Is it sufficient that Hezbollah is seen as more
prone to utilize the tool of political assassination than the other political
camp?
It is in this sense that the charge of selective justice resonates to a
degree - that the jurisdiction of the STL was not fashioned with an
even-handedness with respect to the ongoing political conflict in Lebanon.
Ultimately, however, the legitimacy of the STL can be grounded in
a few simple observations. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is focused on
what appears to be the intentional killing of a human being. Murder is
universally recognized as a crime. It is criminally prohibited in every
legal system in the world. The final characterization of the crime and
the determination of criminal responsibility are left to the Tribunal.
The STL is mandated to provide a fair process and to comply with international human rights standards. In this manner it provides protection against unwarranted accusations and unjustified assertions of
criminal responsibility. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is broad enough to
thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the assassination
and to make a reliable determination of criminal responsibility. It is
certainly the case that there have been other serious crimes committed
in Lebanon and that there are many other victims deserving of justice,
but that fact does not delegitimize this murder prosecution.
Nonetheless, of all the ad hoc tribunals created to date, the STL arguably represents the clearest example of the instrumental use of international courts, and as such, comes the closest to legitimacy's tipping
point. Although it may be appropriate for politics to play a role in shaping a court's subject matter jurisdiction, even in relation to conduct that
has already been committed, it must be undertaken with caution. Excessive manipulation of a tribunal's jurisdiction could compromise the
perception of even-handedness and could also lead to a decontextualization of, and thus misapprehension of, conduct.
This is also the greatest challenge to the U.S. pragmatist position.
The idea of a court comes with a lot of ideological baggage, some of
which resounds in other value-laden areas of international law. Indeed,
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international law as a whole has been permeated by the development of
human rights law, as well as older notions of equality before the law
and other principles of natural justice. Although this baggage may not
be essential to a court's technical operation, it still serves an important
purpose. Courts find their credibility and legitimacy in that baggage.

